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 “It's impossible to move, to live, to operate at any level without leaving traces, bits, 
seemingly meaningless fragments of personal information.” William Gibson 
 
 
1 Introduction 
By utilising the latest cellphone technology, non-communicative personal information, 
such as, the number that is dialled, the time the call is made, the movement and location 
of both the caller and the recipient of a call, can be obtained.  
 
This information is not ordinarily available to the police and it usually requires prior 
judicial authorisation to access this information. The problem is, that the cellphone 
companies, their employees, and criminals who want to know the location and movement 
of other citizens in order to commit crime, can access this information. The Protection of 
Personal Information Bill1 suggests new methods of operating with regard to the 
collection and/or dissemination of any personal information and aims to protect 
individual’s right to data privacy and protection of personal information. If an individual 
has a right to privacy in his movement and location is not addressed by the Bill. This bill 
must, however still be passed by Parliament.  
 
On the other hand, this type of information, if utilised by the police services, can play a 
crucial role in solving crime, and the use thereof should be encouraged to solve crimes, 
provided that the proper legal authorisation is obtained. Are the nature and extent of non-
communicative information, and details obtained from cellphone records, such as, the 
location and movement of users, worthy of being protected by the right to privacy?  
The right to privacy has been included in the South African Constitution2 as a 
fundamental right and enjoys both common law and constitutional protection. Neethling 
has formulated the following definition:  
 
“Privacy is an individual condition of life of separation from publicity. This condition of 
                                                 
1 The Protection of Personal Information Bill [B9-2009] was tabled in Parliament on 25 August 2009.  
Available at: http://www.pmg.org.za/bill/20090825-protection-personal-information-bill-b9-2009.  Accessed 14 April 2010.   
2 Section 14 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (the Constitution).   
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life em-braces all those personal facts which the person concerned has determined to be 
excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which he has a will that they 
be kept private.”3  
 
This definition has been accepted by both the Appellate Division4 and the Constitutional 
Court5, and will constitute the basis of the discussion of the right to privacy in this article.  
 
The right to privacy includes the right to have control over personal information, and the 
right to be able to conduct personal affairs relatively free from unwanted intrusions.6 It 
has usually been interpreted to include telecommunications and the contents thereof, 
which the state will be able to access only with prior judicial authorisation.7 
 
It could be assumed that the same rule would apply also to the content of 
communications via cellphone. However, cellphone technology has spawned an industry-
wide practice of cellphone companies recording and storing non-communicative 
information about users and usage. It is seldom realised what details are left in the wake 
of one single call. Personal information, such as, the number dialled, the time and 
duration of the call, the location of both the caller and the recipient, are routinely 
recorded in respect of each and every call made by all phones.8  
 
There is always the possibility that this stored information can be accessed and conveyed 
to others at a later stage, with or without the user’s consent.  
 
This information is not ordinarily available to the police and they do not have unlimited 
and unrestricted access to it. However, the police would be able to obtain access with 
prior judicial authorisation in the form of a subpoena issued by a court.9 In addition, the 
cellphone companies themselves, their employees, computer hackers, and possibly even 
criminals, can have access to this information. The potential for abuse is enormous.  
 
The key issue with regard to cellphones is whether the keeping and use of this non-
communicative information by cellphone companies are intrusions on an individual’s 
right to privacy. Does the right to privacy protect non-communicative personal 
information obtained from cellphone records?  
                                                 
3 Neethling, Die Reg op Privaatheid, Doctoral Thesis Unisa, (1976) 287. Neethling, Potgieter, Visser  
Law of Delict 4 ed, (2001) 355.   
4 National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) 271.   
5 Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) para 68.   
6 Neethling, Persoonlikheidsreg, Butterworths 39 and National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 271 –2. It gives a person the 
right to control what others know about him or her. It includes the right to walk naked in homes, to enjoy alcohol in the privacy of a 
home, to read whatever books or magazines one chooses to and to decide what others should know or should not know about one. It 
also includes the right to make certain personal choices regarding sexual relations.   
7 Section 40 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication Related Information Act. No 70 of 
2002 (RICA).   
8 Cell phone records can indicate precisely where a user was on a specific day, by using the records of the cell phone companies. 
The precise geographical area from where the call was made and the location where the recipient was can be ascertained. This can 
be determined by looking at which tower was used in making the call, the time of the call, the duration of the call and which tower 
received the call. All this information is obtainable from the printouts of cell phone records from cell phone companies.  
An expert, if required will, be able to plot all the detail on a map to indicate with precision where a user was when a call was made. 
A user who uses a cell phone on a specific day and makes a number of calls whilst moving around can have the movements plotted 
on a map and it can then be traced by making use of cell phone records. Hamman A J, The right to privacy and the challenge of 
modern cell phone technology. Unpublished Master’s Thesis UWC, (2004) 287.   
9 Subpoena usually issued in terms of Section 205 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. This would seem to be a justifiable 
infringement of the right to privacy in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.   
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Cellphone technology has been, and definitely will be, utilised by law enforcement 
agencies in order to combat crime.10 The challenge is to protect citizens’ privacy in this 
process. 
 
2 Privacy under the common law 
Before the entrenchment of the right to privacy in the Constitution it was recognised by 
the common law as an important right, which warrants protection.11  
 
The following examples are breaches of privacy recognised by the common law:  
Entry into a private residence, the reading of private documents, the disclosure of private 
documents, listening in to private conversations, the shadowing of a person, the 
disclosure of private facts which have been acquired by a wrongful intrusion, and the 
disclosure of private facts in breach of a relationship of confidentiality.12  
 
The common law right to privacy has also been deemed violated where a person’s 
photograph is published as part of an advertisement without the consent of the person;13 
by a doctor informing third parties that his patient had HIV;14 by the wire-tapping or 
‘bugging’ of private premises;15 and by peeping at a woman while she is undressing.16 16 
The examples are all closely related to what should be regarded as private and 
confidential, namely, aspects of a person’s autobiographical details.  
 
There is no indication that the common law principles will also apply to non –
communicative personal information which is obtained from cellphone records. The 
common law does not provide an answer to the question whether personal information, 
such as the location and movement of cell phone users should receive protection by the 
right to privacy, although the shadowing of a person was regarded as an infringement of 
                                                 
10 In S v Petersen unreported case heard in the Cape High Court Case No. SS 95/98 advanced cell phone technology was utilised by 
the prosecution. The detailed billing records were obtained from cell phone companies, and the information obtained from the cell 
phone records assisted the court in reaching a verdict. This case was flagged as the first in South Africa to make use of advanced 
cell phone technology. 
The court found that the State had proved, with extracts from the cell phone records, that 12 calls had been made from one specific 
cell phone to another during a period of 52 minutes between 01:20 and 2: 12.It was also found that the calls were made according to 
the route that was mapped out by using the cell phone records. Cell phone records indicated precisely the area where calls were 
made from and the location of the recipient. An expert was able to plot all the detail on a map to indicate with precision where the 
user was when calls were made. Without the cell phone records used in this case there was no direct evidence against the accused, 
as there were no eyewitnesses.  
The two accused were linked to the crime by means of cell phone technology with extreme accuracy by compiling a route map 
using the cell phone records. The irrefutable evidence of the mapped cell phone records destroyed the alibis ventured by the two 
accused.  
Other information obtained from Sunday Times 26 September 1999 available at www.suntimes.co.za/1999/09/26/insight/in01.html  
and  www.mnet.co.za/CarteBlanche/Display/Display.asp?Id=1637   
In S v Moodley detectives used cell phone records to identify the perpetrator. Subpoenas were issued to the various cell phone 
companies to provide a database of all phone calls made from near the spot where Leigh Mathews had been murdered. The accused 
had made a mistake by phoning his girlfriend from near the bloody spot where the murder had taken place. The cell phone records 
indicated that he made one call on his phone within one minute after the ransom demand call was made on Matthews’ phone to her 
father. Sunday times 31 July 2005 page 1 & 3.   
11 De Waal, Currie, Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 268. The common law recognizes the right to privacy as an 
independent personality right, which the courts consider to be part of the concept of a person’s ‘dignitas’. An iniuria occurs when 
there is an unlawful intrusion on someone’s personal privacy (a breach of a person’s privacy or an unlawful disclosure of private 
facts about a person).   
12 Mentioned by Ackerman J in Bernstein v Bester para 69.   
13O’Keefe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) S A 244 (C).    
14 Jansen Van Vuuren v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (A).   
15 S v A 1971 (2) SA 293 (T).   
16 R v Holiday 1927 CPD 395.   
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that right.17 
 
3 The constitutional right to privacy 
3 1 Section 14 
Section 14 of the Constitution reads as follows:  
 
“Everyone has the right to privacy, which shall include the right not to have  
(a) their person or home searched;  
(b) their property searched;  
(c) their possessions seized; or  
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.”18  
 
The section consists of two parts.19 The first part guarantees a general right to privacy and 
the second part protects against specific infringements of privacy. A right of privacy to 
information in possession of a third party (e.g. a cellphone company’s information in its 
possession about an individual’s movement and location) would probably fall under the 
first part. As a fundamental right it can be limited in accordance with the limitation 
clause, that is, by a law of general application.20 
 
An assessment of an invasion of privacy in terms of the Constitution differs from a 
common law assessment. The common law operates in terms of a single enquiry: it must 
be determined that the invasion is unlawful and that there are no grounds of justification 
present.21Ackerman J in Bernstein held that the Constitutional Court should guard 
against applying the common law principles to interpret fundamental rights.22 In terms of 
the Constitution it is not a single enquiry but a two-stage analysis:  
 
1. The party who seeks to exclude certain evidence should first establish the scope of the 
right to determine whether certain conduct has infringed that right. An individual will 
have to prove that he/she has a subjective expectation of privacy and that society has 
recognised that expectation as being reasonable.  
2. If an infringement occurred, or there has been an invasion of the right to privacy, it 
must be determined whether it was a legitimate limitation to allow the information to be 
admissible as evidence.23  
 
The limitation of the right to privacy is a separate inquiry. If an infringement of a right 
has taken place, it must be determined whether such infringement was justifiable in terms 
of the Constitution.24 If the infringement was not justifiable, the aggrieved party must 
                                                 
17 Epstein v Epstein 1906 TH 87.   
18 The Constitution.   
19 De Waal, Currie, Erasmus 267.   
20 Neethling, Potgieter Visser 19.   
21 De Waal, Currie, Erasmus 269.   
22 Bernstein para 71.   
23 Bernstein para 90.   
24 Section 36 (1) of the Constitution provides:  
“The rights in the bill of rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all 
relevant factors, including-  
(a) the nature of the right  
(b) the importance of the limitation  
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation  
https://repository.uwc.ac.za
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have certain remedies against those who infringed the right.  
 
Right to privacy cases that have come before the Constitutional Court may be classified 
into two broad categories: inner core privacy and business privacy. In NM and Others v 
Smith and Others CCT 69/05 it was held that the right to privacy protects citizens from 
the publication of private medical information without their consent.25 
 
3 2 The inner core/ inner sanctum 
The inner core/inner sanctum of the privacy of an individual is the most sacred private 
area of a person’s life. The strongest protection will be afforded to that which constitutes 
the “inner core” of privacy or what takes place in the “inner sanctum” of an individual. 
The “inner core” of privacy was referred to in Case v Minister of Safety and Security as 
that which is done in the privacy of an individual’s home and what type of erotic material 
is kept in the privacy of a home.26 A person’s family life, sexual relationships, sexual 
preferences and home environment form part of this inner core, which will be protected 
by the right to privacy.27 But as a person moves into communal relations and activities, 
such as, business and social interaction, the scope of protected personal space shrinks 
accordingly.28 The right to privacy, thus, will be reduced the further the individual moves 
away from this inner core. 
 
3 3 Business 
The privacy in the business of an individual is what takes place in the business life of an 
individual. In Hyundai,29 the Constitutional Court qualified the “inner core” principle. 
Inthis case search warrants were authorised, which allowed the respondents to conduct a 
search and seizure at the place of business of certain individuals. As a result of the 
operation a large quantity of documents, records and data was seized. The Court held, per 
Langa DP, that persons continued to retain a right to privacy in the social capacities in 
which they acted. The Court stated that: 
  
“The right [to privacy], however, does not relate solely to the individual within his or her 
intimate space. Ackerman J did not state in the above passage that when we move beyond 
this established ‘intimate core’, we no longer retain a right to privacy in the social 
capacities in which we act. Thus, when people are in their offices, in their cars or on 
mobile telephones, they still retain a right to be left alone by the State unless certain 
                                                                                                                                                                
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose   
25 NM and Others v Smith and Others CCT 69/05. The names and HIV status published in a book without the individual’s consent 
was held to violate the privacy rights and dignitas of the person.   
26 Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 165 (CC).   
27 Case v Minister of Safety and Security. Stated that it is nobody’s business what is done in the privacy of one’s home. Part of this 
inner core is the right to make decisions concerning sexual relationships. The offence of possession of obscene photographic matter, 
in contravention of section 2(1) of the Indecent or Obscene Photographic Materials Act 37 of 1967 was declared to be inconsistent 
with the Constitution and invalid. The Court held that the offence infringed the right to privacy of individuals and that there was no 
justification for this infringement. Didcott J held para 91:  
”what erotic material I may choose to keep within the privacy of my home, and only for personal use there, is nobody’s 
business, but mine. It certainly is not the business of society or the state. Any ban imposed on my possession of such 
material for that solitary purpose invades the personal privacy which section 13 of the Interim Constitution… guarantees 
that I shall enjoy.”  
It was regarded as an aspect of the right to be left alone that was considered in the National Coalition for the Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v the Minster of Justice.1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). What an individual decides regarding his family life, sexual preference and 
sexual relationships is regarded as being personal and he/she must be left alone regarding the decision.   
28 Bernstein para 67.   
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conditions are satisfied. Wherever a person has the ability to decide what he or she wishes 
to disclose to the public and the expectation that such decision will be respected as 
reasonable the right to privacy will come into play”30  
 
Even if there is a move away from the inner core, protection will still be afforded to an 
individual.  
 
The more public the undertaking, and the more closely it is regulated, the more 
attenuated the right to privacy would be, and the less likely any possible invasion.31 
Although privacy rights can exist in a business, the more public the manner in which a 
business is being regulated, the possibility of an invasion of privacy will be reduced. The 
right to privacy will also be extended to personal space at places of employment and 
business.  
In Mistry32 it was held that the entering, searching and seizing in terms of the Medicines 
and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965 was an unjustifiable breach of the right to 
privacy.  
 
3 4 Information and communications   
It has been established that the right to privacy protects the content of telephone 
conversations. In Protea Technology v Wainer it was held that where an employee makes 
and receives calls that have nothing to do with his or her employer’s business, a legitimate 
expectation of privacy exists in respect of the content of such calls.33  
 
False and misleading information furnished by the police to obtain a direction to tap cell 
phones in S v Naidoo, resulted in the direction being declared invalid, and the monitoring 
of the cellphone conversations an unjustifiable violation of the right to privacy.34 In S v 
Nkabinde the monitored conversations between an accused and his legal representative 
were also held to be an invasion of the right to privacy of the accused.35 These cases, 
however, only relate to the content of telecommunications, they do not address the issue 
whether the protection of privacy will extend to non-communicative information, such as, 
movement and location, obtained from cellphone records. The divulging of private 
medical information without consent was regarded as an infringement of the right to 
privacy in the NM and Others case.36  
 
From the above it is apparent that no authority exists in South African law that the right 
to privacy protects non-communicative personal information, such as, the movement and 
location of cellphone users.  
 
It is submitted that privacy about a person’s location and movement is not part of their 
                                                                                                                                                                
29 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors Pty Ltd and Others; in re 
Hyundai Motor Distributors Pty Ltd and Other v Smit No and others 2000 (10) BCLR1079 (CC).    
30 Hyundai para 16.   
31 Hyundai para 27.   
32 Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 1127(CC).   
33 Protea Technology v Wainer 1997 (9) BCLR 1225 (W).   
34 S v Naidoo 1998 (1) BCLR 46 (D).   
35 S v Nkabinde 1998 (8) BCLR 996 (N).   
36 NM and Others v Smith and Others CCT 69/05. The names and HIV status published in a book without the individual’s consent 
was held to violate the privacy rights and dignitas of the person.   
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“inner core”. In Simons v P4 Radio37, a matter heard by the Broadcasting Tribunal, a 
presenter of the respondent conveyed a listener’s cell phone number to other listeners, 
inviting them to call the said person and debate an issue with him. The presenter did not 
obtain the listener’s permission to convey the number to the public. It was held that this 
amounted to an invasion of the listener’s right to privacy, which was protected by the 
Broadcasting Code and also section 14 of the Constitution. 
 
It was held that the listener had not said anything on air which necessitated the serious 
invasion of his privacy. The Tribunal held that it was hard to imagine a set of facts (short 
of an emergency) which would allow the divulging of a cellphone number without the 
permission of the person involved.38 Such conduct was regarded as a very serious 
invasion of privacy.  
 
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication- 
Related Information Act (RICA)39 also gives protection to communications when it states 
that a court order must be obtained to get access to the content of conversations.40 But 
many third parties hold information (e.g. about the movement and location of cellphone 
users) and about persons (clients). The question that needs to be addressed is:  
Does the right to privacy protect this information?  
 
RICA was enacted to regulate the interception of certain communications and replaced 
previous legislation (e.g. Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992) 
dealing with this. It also places many more responsibilities on cellphone owners and 
cellphone companies, which attempt to eradicate the theft of, and trade in, stolen 
cellphones by compiling a data base of the identity of all cell phone users.  
 
Once the database has been compiled and there is a record of the identity of most of the 
users, it will have the effect that the movements and location of almost every cellphone 
user will be traceable. It will also be possible to locate a person using a cellphone within a 
range of a few metres.  
 
Although, subject to certain exceptions, it is an offence to provide real-time or archived 
information to any person other than the customer,41 RICA does not state that the right to 
privacy protects information regarding the non-communicative information (movement 
and location) of cellphone users. In fact, this Act stipulates that more information 
regarding cellphone users should be kept in databases by cellphone companies. The fact 
that the details of movement and location of users can be ascertained by looking at the 
records presents the possibility that rights of individuals will be infringed, without them 
even realising that these details can be accessed. Moreover, RICA has the result that even 
more information in respect of cell phone users will be in possession of third parties. 
 
                                                 
37 Simons v P4 Radio [2003] JOL 10745 BCCSA (Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa).   
38 Simons (n 38) para 11.   
39 Act 70 of 2002 Commencement of Act on 30 September 2005 except sections 40 and 62. Sections 40 and 62(6) which 
commenced on 30 November 2005 and section 62(1)-(5) to be proclaimed.  
Cell phone operators have objected to certain sections of RICA that compel them to capture their prepaid subscribers’ details using 
a paper-based system instead of an electronic one. http://www.bday.co.za    
40 Section 16 An application for an interception direction must be made to a designated judge.   
41 Section 50(1), 50 (2).   
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3 5 The protection of personal information bill42  
The Protection of Personal Information Bill, if passed by Parliament will give effect to the 
constitutional right to privacy of personal information. New methods of operating with 
regard to the collection and/or dissemination of any personal information stored must be 
regulated. It aims to protect individual’s right to data privacy and protection of personal 
information.43  
 
The purpose of the Bill is to give effect to the constitutional right to privacy, to regulate 
the manner in which personal information may be processed, to provide for persons with 
rights and remedies to protect person al information from processing not in compliance 
with the Bill and to establish an information protection regulator to ensure respect for 
and promote, enforce and protect the rights protected by the Bill.44  
 
Personal information such as information relating to race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental 
status, health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
birth of the person will be regulated. 
 
Other types of information are protected.45 The Bill also contains reference to “Special 
Personal Information” which is information concerning a child who is subject to parental 
control in terms of the law; or a data subject’s religious or philosophical beliefs, race or 
ethnic origin, trade union membership, political opinions, health, sexual life, or criminal 
behaviour.  
 
The processing of personal information and any activity or operation involving personal 
information, whether automated or not, will also be regulated.46 This will include person-
al information stored in databases; address books; payroll systems or manual filing sys-
tems; information sent via email; in word processing programmes; exchanged in con-
tracts with suppliers and recorded on CCTV and in telephone records.  
 
The processing of personal information must comply with certain requirements, which 
are referred to as eight “information protection principles” (“Principles”) in the Bill47.  
The regulator may authorise the processing of information that is in breach of the bill in 
certain circumstances such as where public interest in the processing of the personal in-
formation substantially outweighs any resultant interference with the data subject’s right 
                                                 
42 Protection of Personal Information Bill [B9-2009]. Available at http://www.pmg.org.za/bill/20090825- protection-personal-
information-bill-b9-2009    
43 Information obtained from www.poliy.org.za/article/protection-of-personal-information-bill-2009-10-21.  Accessed 15 April 
2010.   
44 www.deneysreitz.co.za/index.php/news/protection_of_personal_information.  Accessed 14 April 2010.   
45 Information relating to the education or the medical, financial, criminal or employment history of the  
person, any identifying number, symbol, e-mail address, physical address, telephone number or other  
particular assignment to the person; the blood type or any other biometric information of the person; the personal opinions , views 
or preferences of the person; correspondence sent by the person that is implicitly or explicitly of a private confidential nature or 
further correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence; the views or opinions of another individual 
about the person; and the name of the person if it appears with other personal information relating to the person or if the disclosure 
of the name itself would reveal information about the person.   
46 It includes the collection, recording, organisation, storage, updating or modification, retrieval, consultation, use, dissemination by 
means of transmission, distributing or making available in any other form, merging, linking, as well as blocking, erasure or 
destruction of information.   
47 The principles contained in sections 7 to 25 of the Bill deals with accountability, processing limitation, purpose specification, 
further processing limitation, information quality, openness, security safeguards, data participation subject.   
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to privacy.  
 
The Bill further addresses issues pertain to the processing of personal information for 
purpose of direct marketing.48Companies must within one year from the date that the bill 
comes into force, ensure that their processing off personal information complies with the 
legislation and is notify to the regulator. The minister any extend this one year grace pe-
riods to a maximum of three years.  
The Bill, if passed by Parliament, will undoubtedly impact on how companies and other 
institutions manage the processing of any personal information of their employees and 
customers. The cost of compliance for companies and other institutions will certainly be 
substantial. The bill, however does not address the issue about the right to privacy in non-
communicative cellphone information.  
 
Since the Constitution prescribes that international law must be considered when a court, 
tribunal or forum interprets the Bill of Rights, and that regard may also be had to foreign 
law,49 a study of these sources may provide some assistance regarding the right to privacy 
(in respect of movement and location) of cellphone users, as well as the proper regulation 
of access to such information held by third parties.  
 
4 International law  
International law will be referred to in order to ascertain how privacy has been defined, 
and what the extent and scope of the realm of privacy are.  
 
4 1 International Instruments  
A number of international instruments dealing with privacy and privacy in personal data 
evolved over a long period. The fact that vast quantities of information can be transmitted 
within seconds between countries necessitated that consideration be given to establishing 
privacy protection guidelines in relation to personal data.  
 
The privacy benchmark at international level can be found in Article 12 of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the UDHR), which states:  
 
“No one should be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks on his honour or reputation. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interferences or attacks.”  
 
Numerous other international human rights instruments contain provisions in almost the 
same language, which specifically recognise the right to privacy. Article 17 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)50 is worded similarly to 
                                                 
48 Information for the purpose of direct marketing by means of automatic calling machines, facsimile machi9nes, SMSs or 
electronic mail is prohibited unless the data subject has given consent to the pro-cessing.   
49 Sec 39 (1) of The Constitution.  
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum  
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;  
(b) must consider international law; and  
(c) may consider foreign law.   
50 “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation  
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”   
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Article 12 of the UDHR.  
 
The UN Human Rights Committee commented that Article 17 of the ICCPR should be 
given a broad interpretation to include ‘the place where a person resides or carries out his 
usual occupation’.51  
 
Article 14 of the 1990 United Nations Convention on Migrant Workers52 contains privacy 
provisions similar to those in the UDHR and the ICCPR.  
 
In similar vein, the privacy rights of a child are protected in Article 16 of the United 
Nations Convention on Protection of the Child.53 Should any interference with a child’s 
privacy take place, it must be lawful in terms of domestic laws and not arbitrary. The 
interference, in any event, should be reasonable in the circumstances. If legislation is 
enacted which allows interference, it must specify in detail the precise circumstances in 
which such interference will be permitted.54  
 
The United Nations Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data Files55 are 
intended to encourage both those UN member states without data protection legislation 
in place to take steps to enact legislation based on the Guidelines, as well as international 
organisations to process personal data in a responsible, fair and privacy-friendly manner.  
The compilation and keeping of data- recorded information must be accurate and only for 
a specific purpose. People should have the right to know what information about them is 
stored. 
 
4 2 Regional Instruments  
4 2 1 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental  
Freedoms  
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms created the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Human Rights to oversee the enforcement of the rights stipulated in Article 8, which 
reads as follows:  
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
 
                                                 
51 Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure (1998) 79.   
52 “No migrant worker or member of his or her family shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interferences with his or her 
privacy, family, home, correspondence or other communications, or to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation. Each 
migrant worker and member of his or her family shall have the right to the protection of the law against such interference.”   
53 “1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor 
to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.  
2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”   
54 Steytler 80.   
55 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1990. Available at  
www.datenschutz-berlin.de/gesetze/internat/aen.htm.    
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4 2 2 Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights  
The European Court of Human Rights regards Article 8 as reflecting a general right to 
privacy.56 In Klass v Germany the Court held that telephone conversations are included 
in the notions of “private life” and “correspondence”57. This protection was extended in 
Kruslin v France to protect not only the subscriber to a telephone service, but any user of 
a telephone.58  
 
In Malone v United Kingdom it was held that telephone tapping is a violation of the 
privacy rights guaranteed under Article 8.59 As a result of this metering, information 
about the details of the numbers dialled on a particular phone, as well as the time and 
duration of calls, could be ascertained.60 The release of that type of information to the 
police was not permissible without the consent of the subscriber. Information regarding 
the telephone numbers dialled from a specific telephone was an integral element of 
telephone communications; it was regarded as private and important enough to be 
protected as falling within the notions of “private life” and “correspondence” under Article 
8.  
 
In Niemitz v Germany a broad interpretation was given to private life and the home. It 
was held that the office of a lawyer fell within the protected sphere of privacy.61  
Information conveyed to a third party, although private, will not automatically receive 
protection under Article 8. In M.S v Sweden it was held that it would depend on the 
manner in which the information was conveyed to the third party.62 If the information 
had been disclosed earlier to another public authority and, therefore, to a wider circle of 
public servants, the disclosure of the information could be justified. This will be the case 
even if the information conveyed was of a confidential nature. Although there had been an 
interference with the applicant’s right to respect for private life under paragraph 1 of 
Article 8, the interference had been justified under paragraph 2. Although the medical 
records contained personal information that was indeed of a very personal and sensitive 
nature, it had been conveyed earlier to a wide circle of public servants that had access to 
the information.  
 
It thus seems that the manner in which information is conveyed to a third party, and the  
number of people who will have access to the information, play an important part in the 
right to receive protection for the information.  
 
4 2 3 American Convention of Human Rights  
Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights63 sets out the right to privacy in 
terms similar to the UDHR. It is interesting to note that the African Charter on Human 
                                                 
56 Steytler 80.   
57 Klass v Germany 6 September Series A no 28 at 41.   
58 Kruslin v France 24 April 1990 Series A no 176-a.   
59 Malone v United Kingdom 2 August 1984 Series A no 82.   
60 Malone v United Kingdom Para 83.   
61 Niemits v Germany 16 December 1992 Series A no 251 B.   
62 M.S. v Sweden (74/1996/693/885) 27 August 1997.   
63 “1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or correspondence, or of 
unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. 
3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attack.” 
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and Peoples’ Rights64 does not make any reference to privacy rights.  
 
4 2 4 Instruments dealing with data protection  
Over the past 20 years technology has developed at an alarming pace and resulted in the 
automatic processing, collection and storage of personal information of individuals. A 
need arose to have regulations to safeguard the rights of individuals. Various regional 
instruments65 contain principles that are very similar to the United Nations Guidelines 
Concerning Computerized Personal Data Files. It is apparent that a general right to 
privacy exists, but the international instruments do not indicate that the right to privacy 
protects non-communicative personal information, such as, the movement and location 
of cellphone users.  
 
5 Comparative Jurisdictions  
5 1 The United States of America  
The jurisprudence of the United States of America has been influential both in South 
Africa and other countries. Although the word “privacy’ is not mentioned in the Fourth 
Amendment or anywhere else in the American Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment 
has been interpreted to include a general right to privacy, a right to be let alone, with 
respect to fundamental decisions concerning the individual’s person.66 Protection was 
given to adults to engage in private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due 
Process Clause of this Amendment.67  
 
It is Gormley’s68 opinion that scholars in America have been unable to agree upon any 
one-size-fits-all definition of privacy and that it actually consists of five distinct species.69  
 
It is submitted that non-communicative information obtained from cell phone records 
                                                 
64 Adopted by the 18th Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU on 27 June 1981 at Nairobi.   
65 1. The Council of Europe: Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
(CoE Convention);65 
2. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data (OECD Guidelines); 
3. European Union Directive on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of Personal Data and the Free 
Movement of Such Data (EU directive) 
66 Griswold v Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
Where it was held that a law forbidding the use and distribution of contraceptives violated the right of  
”marital privacy”.  
Roe v Wade 416 U.S. 113 (1973).  
The substantive right of privacy inherent in the due process clause was “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or 
not to terminate her pregnancy”.   
67 Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.   
68 Gormley “One Hundred Years of Privacy” 1992 Wisconsin Law Review 1335.   
69 Gormley para 1434.  
“1. The Privacy of Warren and Brandeis (Tort Privacy): is the right to be let alone with respect to the acquisition and 
dissemination of information concerning the person, particularly through unauthorized publication, photography or other 
media.  
2. Fourth Amendment Privacy: (relating to warrantless governmental searches and seizures), the right to be let alone, 
with respect to governmental searches and seizures which invade a sphere of individual solitude deemed reasonable by 
society.  
3. First Amendment Privacy: the right to be let alone, when an individual’s freedom of speech threatens to disrupt 
another citizen’s liberty of thought and repose.  
4. Fundamental-Decision Privacy: the right to be let alone, with respect to fundamental (often unanticipated) 
decisions69 concerning the individual’s own person, which are explicitly reserved to the citizen (rather than ceded to the 
government) by the terms of the social contract. (Fourteenth Amendment Privacy.)  
5. State Constitutional Privacy: the right to be let alone, with respect to a variety of private and governmental intrusions 
generally often overlapping with species number one through number four above, yet often extending greater protections 
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probably falls under the Fourth Amendment, which deals with search and seizure and 
which reads:  
 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  
 
 
The Fourth Amendment requires that there should be a warrant before a search and 
seizure will be justified. A development also took place that there should be “a reasonable 
expectation of privacy” before a search is regarded as being unreasonable, and that it 
must be established that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the information 
before prior authorisation in the form of a warrant is required.  
 
At first the physical invasion of property was required to warrant protection under the 
Fourth Amendment. Violations of the Fourth Amendment only took place where there 
was a physical trespass on property, or seizure of material goods; government agents 
could employ dictaphones and microphones to listen to conversations as long as a 
defendant’s property or person was not touched.70  
 
In 1961, in Silverman v United States,71 the Court changed its approach. It disallowed the 
use of a “spike mike”, driven into the wall of a row house, which tapped into the heating 
duct and allowed officers to monitor conversations within the defendant’s entire house. 
However, the Court still required some physical invasion of the premises and found that it 
was constituted in this case by the contact with the heating duct.  
 
Katz v United States initiated the development of a reasonable expectation of privacy.72 
Charles Katz was arrested by federal authorities in Los Angeles, after an electronic 
listening device attached to the outside of a telephone booth was used to record his 
conversations as he ran bookmaking activities in Boston and Miami. The Court found that 
this mode of gathering evidence did not comply with the Fourth Amendment, even 
though the physical property of the defendant had not been violated. Justice Stewart’s 
opinion was that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places”.73 In dealing with 
the privacy concept under the Fourth Amendment, he went on to say that “what a person 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”74  
 
Justice Harlan, in his concurring judgment, initiated the notion of “reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                                
to the citizen by   
70 Olmstead v United States 277 U S 438 (1928), the Court held that where no physical invasion of the defendant’s premises 
occurred, there would not be protection under the Fourth Amendment. Wiretapping thus was not covered by the Amendment 
because the government had not invaded the defendant’s premises physically. In Goldman v United States, 316 U S.129 (1942)., it 
was found that a detector placed against the wall of an adjoining room, did not qualify as a search and seizure. During this period 
the notion was reinforced that violations of the Fourth Amendment only took place where there was a physical trespass on property 
or seizure of material goods.   
71 Silverman v United States 365 U.S. 505 (1961).   
72 Katz v United States 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).   
73 Katz 351.   
74 Katz.   
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expectation of privacy”, which is now regarded as the standard for search and seizure.75 It 
is a two-requirement test, which was confirmed in Kyllo vs. United States in the following 
manner:  
 
“[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective 
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable… a Fourth Amendment 
search does not occur- even in the explicit projection of a house – unless the individual 
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search, and 
society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as  
Reasonable.”76 
 
First there must be a reasonable expectation of privacy in the mind of the person whose 
right will be/was infringed. Secondly, in addition to the individual manifesting a 
subjective expectation in the object of the search, society must be willing to recognise that 
expectation as reasonable. The second requirement thus brings an objective element into 
the test.  
 
5 1 1 Information revealing certain details  
Does American law grant an individual a right of privacy in non-communicative 
information revealing details, such as location and movement? In Smith v Maryland77 the 
Supreme Court held that an individual targeted in a pen registering78 does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers dialled from his home. An 
individual was assumed to know that in dialling a number, certain numerical information 
(date, time, and length of the call) was recorded by the communications service provider 
for billing purposes.79  
 
Because the user voluntarily conveyed this information to the phone company, the 
installation and use, of a pen register was not a search, and no warrant was required. It 
seems that if there is an element of voluntariness present, the expectation of privacy is 
diminished; the fact that the details were voluntarily conveyed to the phone company is 
regarded as a waiver of the reasonable expectation of privacy in this information.80  
 
If information is revealed to a third party, there also seems to be no expectation of privacy 
in such information. The bank records of an individual were subpoenaed in United States 
v Miller.81 It was held that a restrictive meaning should be ascribed to “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in this case, where a bank depositor claimed that the government 
                                                 
75 Katz 360 –361.  
This two requirement test of “reasonable expectation of privacy” was soon afterwards adopted by the majority of the court in Terry 
v Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). The test stipulates:  
1.That the individual had an “actual” expectation of privacy and  
2 That the expectation was “one that society was prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’ ”.   
76 Kyllo v United States 533 U.S. 27 (2001) 190 F 3d 1041. It was held that no subjective expectation of privacy existed, because 
any amount of heat emerging from the home of the appellant was not concealed.  
The imager did not expose intimate details of his life. On appeal it was held that where the government  
uses a [sense-enhancing] device, not in general public use, to expose details of the home that would previously have been unknown 
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.   
77 Smith v Maryland 442 U. S 735 (1979).   
78 The pen register is a device that records the date, time, and length of calls, information that is usually gathered already by phone 
companies for billing purposes by a communications service provider.   
79 Smith v Maryland   
80 See also Swedish judgment M.S v Sweden.   
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had to satisfy Fourth Amendment standards in order to obtain his financial records from 
his bank.  
 
The Court held that a depositor had no expectation of privacy in financial information 
voluntarily conveyed to the bank, and because the information was exposed to its 
employees in the ordinary course of business. The Court found that an individual assumes 
the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the latter may then also reveal this 
information.  
 
An exclusion of the reasonable expectation of privacy seems to have developed in the 
Smith and Miller cases. It is submitted that the United States Supreme Court will in all 
probability not afford protection to non-communicative cellphone information.  
 
5 2 Canada  
The jurisprudence developed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the 
Charter) has been most influential in South African courts.82 There is no explicit right to 
privacy in either Canada’s Constitution or Charter. However, in interpreting section 8 of 
the Charter, which grants the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, 
Canadian courts have recognised an individual's right to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.83  
 
Privacy at the federal level is protected by two Acts: the 1982 Privacy Act and the 2001 
Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). The Privacy Act regulates 
the collection, use and disclosure of personal information held by federal public agencies, 
and grants individuals a right of access to personal information held by those agencies, 
subject to certain exceptions, including an exemption for court records. PIPEDA is 
applicable to private sector organisations that process personal information "in the course 
of a commercial activity", and also applicable to federally regulated employers with 
respect to their employees. It does not apply to information collected for personal, 
journalistic, artistic, literary or non-commercial purposes. 
 
The right to privacy is also regarded as not subject to unreasonable searches or seizures. 
Evidence obtained as a result thereof will be excluded if it is found that the admission of 
the improperly obtained evidence would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute.84  
There will be certain situations when individuals will feel that information about them 
should not be revealed.85  
                                                                                                                                                                
81 United States v Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).   
82 Steytler 13.   
 
83 Hunter v Southam [1994] 2 S.C.R.145.   
84 The Charter guarantees certain rights.  
Section 24 reads:  
(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this chapter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court 
of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy, as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.  
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed 
or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that having 
regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice in 
disrepute.   
85 R v Dyement [1988] 2 S.C.R 417. it was stated that:  
“In modern society the retention of information about oneself is extremely important and that we may for one reason or another, 
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5 2 1 The two-stage test  
Canada has also developed a notion of “reasonable expectation of privacy”. In Hunter v 
Southam the Supreme Court ruled that the guarantee provided in section 8 of the Charter 
is applicable only where individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy86. The 
purpose of section 8 was to protect individuals from unjustified state intrusions. In 
British Columbia Securities Commission v Branch, the Court, referring to Hunter, stated 
that the context within which the violation takes place must be considered, for it is the 
context which determines the expectation of privacy.87  
 
In R v McKinley it was held that individuals have different expectations of privacy in 
different contexts and with regard to different kinds of information and documents.88 
 
There should be a standard to determine what is reasonable in a given context, and this 
standard must be flexible if it is to be realistic and meaningful. The test in Canada is, 
therefore also a two-stage one. First, an individual must manifest an expectation of 
privacy in the item/information. Secondly, an objective review to examine whether the 
expectation was indeed reasonable will determine if the intrusion was justified or not. A 
reasonable expectation of privacy is to be determined on the basis of the totality of the 
circumstances.89 
 
It was held in Thompson Newspaper Ltd v Canada90 that, whether a public authority 
takes documents or compels someone to hand them over, it infringes the right to privacy, 
and the conduct will be regarded as a seizure in terms of section 8.  
 
5 2 2 R v Plant  
The case of Plant91 is critical for our enquiry. It was held that the right to privacy should 
be confined to a biographical core of personal information, which may reveal intimate 
details of an individual’s lifestyle and personal choices.92  
 
On 9 March 1990 the Calgary police received an anonymous tip that marijuana was being 
grown at a certain dwelling. Without obtaining prior judicial authorisation, they used a 
terminal linked to the Utilities Commission’s computer to check the electrical 
consumption at the dwelling: over a period of six months it was four times higher than the 
                                                                                                                                                                
wish to be compelled to reveal such information, but there will be situations when we will feel that we are not compelled and that 
information about us should not be revealed to others.”   
86 Hunter v Southam (n 84) 145.   
87 British Columbia Securities Commission v Branch (1995) 97 CCC (3d) 565 (SCC).   
88 R v McKinley [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627 645.   
89 R v Edwards [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128. The factors to be considered in assessing the totality of the  
circumstances may include, but are not restricted to,  
(a) The presence at the time of the search  
(b) The possession of the property or place searched  
(c) The ownership of the property or place,  
(d) Historical use of the property or item,  
(e) The ability to regulate access, including the right to admit or exclude others from the place  
(f). The existence of a subjective expectation of privacy  
(g) The objective reasonableness of the expectation.   
90 Thompson Newspaper Ltd, v Canada (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 161 (SCC).   
91 R v Plant [1993] 3 SCR 281. Confirmed in R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, 2004 SCC 67   
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average of two other residences with which it was compared. 
 
This information was used to obtain a search warrant. One of the questions the Court had 
to decide was: did the information obtained from the computer records of the Utilities 
Commission reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the accused? If 
it was found that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information, 
the police would have needed to obtain a warrant to access it.  
 
It was held that to answer the questions various factors had to be considered, and that in 
considering them a balancing of interests must take place. On the one hand, the 
individual’s dignity, integrity and autonomy must be protected and, on the other hand, 
the interest of effective law enforcement must be considered. There was disagreement as 
to how this should be resolved and the Court’s judgment was not unanimous.  
 
 
 
The majority of the Court93 considered the following factors:  
(a) The nature of the information  
The Court held that the information seized must be of a “personal and confidential” 
nature that tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the 
individual. The computer record only revealed how much electricity was consumed; an 
inference could not be drawn from the electricity consumption that an individual had 
made certain personal and private decisions.94 
  
(b) The relationship between the party releasing the information and the 
party claiming its confidentiality  
It was held that the nature of the relationship between the appellant and the Utilities 
Commission could not be characterised as a relationship of confidence. The records were 
prepared as part of an ongoing commercial relationship and there was no evidence that 
the Utilities Commission was contractually bound to keep the records confidential. The 
Court, however, qualified the above statement by saying that it was not suggesting that 
records prepared in a commercial context can never be subject to privacy protection in 
terms of section 8; if it were found that commercial records contained material which 
meets the “personal and confidential” standard, the commercial nature of the relationship 
would not prevent protection by the right to privacy.  
 
It was held further that it generally was possible for an individual to inquire about the 
electricity consumption at a particular address and that the information was subject to 
inspection by members of the public at large. No policies had developed against releasing 
                                                                                                                                                                
92 “Although the information about the distribution of the heat was not visible to the naked eye, the FLIR heat profile did not 
expose any intimate details of the accused's lifestyle or part of his core biographical data”. It only showed that some of the 
activities in the house generated heat. My emphasis   
93 The majority judgment of Lamer C.J, La Forest, Sophinka, Gonthier, Cory and Iacobucci JJ, was delivered by Sophinka J.   
94 In the Court of first instance, it was held: The information was created in the context of a commercial transaction. The 
information was collected in order for the electricity company to furnish the user with an electricity account. That is different to the 
privacy expected with regard to confidential information in attorney/client and patient/doctor relationships. The information 
belonged to the electricity supplier and not to the individual. It had been created for billing purposes, for the company’s use and not 
for the customer’s use. Thus in the court a quo, the use of the information also determined the nature thereof and had an influence 
on whether it should be protected or not.   
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electrical consumption information to the police. It was the policy of the Utilities 
Commission to permit police access to the computer bank through a computer password 
held by them.  
 
(c) The place where, and manner in which, the information was obtained  
The Court found that the place where, and manner in which, the information was 
retrieved also indicated that the appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy. The 
police were able to obtain the information on-line, in terms of an agreement with the 
Utilities Commission. There was no intrusion into private places, nor did it involve state 
agents invading personal computer records which were confidentially maintained by 
private citizens. It was held that the fact that the police used a password might have 
suggested an element of privacy, but it could also have suggested that it was intended 
merely to ensure that the information was available to the police on-line. It was stated 
that, in any event, the search was not conducted in an intrusive or high-handed manner.  
 
(d) The seriousness of the crime being investigated  
The Court held that the seriousness of the offence resulted in the requirements of the law 
enforcement agency outweighing the privacy claimed by the appellant. The Court held 
further that although participation in illicit trading of marihuana might not be as serious 
as trade in other narcotics, such as cocaine, it remained an offence which was taken very 
seriously by law enforcement agencies.  
 
The majority, therefore, held that a consideration of all these factors did not warrant the 
conclusion that the appellant had had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to 
the computerised electricity records which outweighed the state’s interest in enforcing the 
laws relating to narcotics offences. Although the Court stated that the information did not 
reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual, it found that 
the conclusion might differ if there were a contractual obligation towards the consumer to 
keep it confidential.  
 
The minority judgment of Mclachlin J stipulated that the question that had to be decided 
was: did the individual have a reasonable expectation that the information in possession 
of the Utilities Commission would be kept in confidence and restricted to the purpose for 
which it had been given? The Judge held that although electricity consumption records 
were close to the line, the evidence disclosed a sufficient expectation of privacy to require 
that the police obtain a warrant before the information was obtained. The information 
should not have been divulged to strangers without proper legal authorisation.  
 
The following reasons were furnished for the finding:  
(a) Records not available to public  
There was no evidence that the records were available to the public; the police only 
obtained access by reason of a special arrangement with the Utilities Commission. The 
details of electricity consumption were capable of telling much about an individual’s 
lifestyle. They indicated how many people were residing in the dwelling and what sort of 
activities probably took place there. The consumption records told a story about what 
happened inside a private dwelling, the most private of places.  
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(b) Records disclosed personal information  
A reasonable person who looked at the facts would in all probability conclude that the 
records would only be used for the purposes for which they had been made, namely, the 
delivery and billing of electricity. The reason that the police wanted access to the records 
was precisely that they wanted to learn about the appellant’s personal lifestyle, the fact 
that he was growing marihuana. Although the electricity records are not as revealing as 
many others, they disclosed important personal information.  
 
(c) Records disclosed a reasonable expectation of privacy  
The point that should have been considered was not whether the relationship between the 
individual and the Utilities Commission was one of confidence, but whether the particular 
records disclosed a reasonable expectation of confidence. The Judge also disagreed with 
the majority finding that the records were available generally totheto the public. Only the 
police had access to the information. The police had to use a special computer, which they 
had been given in confidence, to access the information. This aspect was regarded as a 
very important factor. If it had been found that the records were open to the public, the 
minority might have agreed with the majority that the appellant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the records.  
 
(d) Computers should be regarded as private  
The Judge also disagreed with the majority view that the police had not had to intrude 
into places ordinarily considered private, like a house or hotel room, to get the 
information. It was found that computers might, and should, be regarded as being 
private, especially if they contain information which is subject to legal protection and in 
which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Computers can contain a 
wealth of personal information. Such information, depending on its character, may be as 
private as any found in a dwelling house or hotel room.  
 
(e) Test should be expectation of privacy  
Regarding the seriousness of the offence, reservations were expressed about using a case 
by case approach to determine whether a warrant to obtain information was required or 
not. It was held that the test should remain whether the individual has an expectation of 
privacy in the information. If that test is met, a search without a warrant will constitute a 
violation, even if the suspected offence is a serious one.  
 
It is submitted that the views of the minority judgment should be preferred in evaluating 
the reasonable expectation of privacy in information held by the Utilities Commission.  
The details of electricity consumption were capable of telling much about the individual’s 
lifestyle, namely, they indicated how many people were residing in the dwelling, and what 
sort of activities probably took place there. The consumption records told a story about 
what happened inside the privacy of a private residence. That was precisely the reason for 
getting access to the records, to learn more about the personal lifestyle of the appellant. 
Only the police had access to the records, by means of a special computer which they had 
received in confidence. The majority held to the contrary: that the electricity consumption 
revealed very little about the private decisions of the occupants of the dwelling, and that it 
only revealed how much electricity was consumed by them in that dwelling.  
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5 2 3 Privacy in movement and location  
Does any Canadian authority exist for the view that a person can have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in movement and location? In his dissenting judgment in R v 
Wise95 La Forest J stipulated that such an expectation could exist in information that 
reveals the movement of an individual. He held that the installation of a tracking device in 
the appellant’s car constituted an unlawful trespass and violated the privacy rights under 
section 8 of the Charter. The use of the device that monitored the movements of the 
individual also violated section 8.  
 
It was stated that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, not only in his 
communications, but in his movements as well, even when travelling on a public road. It 
was held that if an individual is in a vehicle and on a public road, his privacy rights are 
also protected. In this case the movements of an individual were tracked earlier. 
 
A distinction was drawn between the risk individuals run by having their activities 
monitored by others and the police monitoring the movements of individuals. It was held 
that a person’s daily moves, whilst travelling, could be observed and even monitored by 
others. However, that was not the same as the risk that agents of the state, in the absence 
of prior authorisation, would be able to track every move made by an individual. It was 
not the case of another individual’s casual glance, look or observation, but a question of 
every move being tracked.  
 
It was found that it is constitutionally unacceptable that the state should justify the 
unauthorised surveillance of individuals on the mere fact that other individuals can 
observe a person. The degree to which a person took measures to shield his activities from 
the scrutiny of other persons should not be decisive in deciding whether that person had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements. Thus, if a person tried to conceal his 
movements or was hiding, it should not be indicative thereof that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  
 
The surreptitious electronic tracking of a person’s movements was held to be a grave 
threat to his privacy. Therefore, to track the movements of an individual, prior judicial 
authorisation should be required. It was held that this would call for an objective showing 
of reasonable and probable cause, and that this generally should be required of those 
seeking to employ electronic devices in the pursuit of individuals. It is submitted that this 
approach is correct and that it will prevent the unauthorised collection of personal 
information.  
 
It seems that a prisoner does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements. In R v Dorfer details about the time when, and place where, the appellant 
would receive treatment were furnished to the police. The Court held that in prison the 
whereabouts of an offender at any given time is information that is not expected to be 
confidential and is related to the proper functioning of a criminal justice system.96 Thus a 
prisoner, it seems, cannot rely on the fact that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
                                                 
95 R v Wise [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527. The majority decision did not mention anything about the right to privacy of movement or 
whereabouts, nor did it mention anything about the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy in movement or location).   
96 R v Dorfer (1996) 104 CC (3d) 528 (BCCA).   
https://repository.uwc.ac.za
21  
regarding his movements. One then could draw the inference that persons in police 
custody, arrested persons, or those who are lawfully detained, also will not have a right to 
privacy in their movements.  
 
Dagg v Canada held that a person could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information relating to his arrival and departure from a certain location.97A request was 
filed with the Department of Finance for copies of logs containing the names, 
identification numbers and signatures of employees entering and leaving their workplace 
on weekends. These logs were kept by security personnel for safety and security reasons, 
but not for verifying overtime claims. The relevant logs were disclosed, but the employee’s 
names, identification numbers and signatures were deleted, on the basis that this 
information disclosed personal information and was thus exempted from disclosure.  
 
The appellant sought a review of the Minister’s decision and filed a complaint with the 
Information Commissioner, arguing that the deleted information should be disclosed by 
virtue of exceptions to the protection of personal information in terms of the Privacy Actof 
198298 The Federal Court (Trial Division), on a review of the Minister’s decision, found 
the information not to be personal, but the Federal Court of Appeal reversed this decision 
on appeal.  
 
An appeal from the Federal Court of Appeal was upheld, and the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that the Minister should reconsider his decision. The dissenting judgment, 
delivered by La Forest J, found that the purpose of the Privacy Act was to protect the 
privacy of individuals with respect to personal information about themselves held by a 
government institution, and to provide individuals access to that information. He stated 
that the employees of the respondent had a reasonable expectation that the information 
in the sign-in logs would not be revealed to the general public. 
 
La Forest J stated that the information requested revealed the following personal details: 
the times during which employees attended their workplace on weekends over a period of 
one month. A reasonable person would not expect strangers to have access to detailed, 
systematic knowledge of their location during non-working hours, even if that location 
was his or her place of employment.  
 
He further found that the information obtained from the sign-in logs kept by the security 
personnel at the place of employment revealed intimate details of the lifestyle and 
personal choices of an individual. If information revealed personal details, in which a 
reasonable expectation of privacy existed, it should not be released without the 
individual’s consent or prior judicial authorisation.  
 
Once an individual has established a reasonable expectation of privacy in certain 
information, the inquiry must then proceed to determine whether the search [divulging of 
information] was conducted in the proper manner.99 To determine whether the search 
was properly done will depend upon whether it was necessary to obtain prior judicial 
                                                 
97 Dagg v Canada (Minister of Finance) [1997] 2 S CR 403.   
98 Privacy Act Canada 1983.   
99 R v Edwards126; Hunter v Southam145.   
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authorisation.  
 
5 2 4 Prior judicial authorisation  
The purpose of prior judicial authorisation was defined in Hunter v Southam:  
 
“The purpose of a requirement of prior authorization is to provide an opportunity, before 
the event, for the conflicting interests of the state and the individual to be assessed, so 
that the individual’s right to privacy will be breached only where the appropriate standard 
has been met, and the interests of the state are thus demonstrably superior. For such an 
authorization procedure to be meaningful it is necessary for the person authorizing the 
search to be able to assess the evidence as to whether that standard has been met, in an 
entirely neutral and impartial manner.”100 
 
It was further stated that it was preferable to have a system of prior authorisation to 
prevent unjustified searches, rather than having a system of subsequent validation.  
Reasonable and probable grounds, established under oath, to believe that an offence has 
been committed and that there is evidence to be found at the place of the search, 
constitute the minimum standard, consistent with section 8, for authority for search and 
seizure.101  
 
It was held in by the majority in Plant102 that the search must be brought within the 
parameters of section 8 to require prior judicial authorisation. It was held that accessing 
the information from the electricity records did not involve an intrusion into places 
ordinarily considered private, and that the information was not of a personal and 
confidential nature. The manner and place of search indicated a minimal intrusion, and 
the seriousness of the offence outweighed the privacy interest claimed by the appellant. 
The appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the 
computerised records which outweighed the interest of the state in enforcing the laws 
relating to narcotic offences; and, therefore it was not necessary to obtain prior judicial 
authorisation.  
 
However in R v Wise103 it was stated by La Forest J that the surreptitious electronic 
tracking of one’s movements is a grave threat to individual privacy, which required prior 
judicial authorisation. Prior judicial authorisation called for an objective indication of 
reasonable and probable cause, which generally should be required of those seeking to 
employ electronic devices in the pursuit of individuals.  
 
Canada goes further than the United States in protecting information. It is submitted that 
the views of the majority, as well as of the minority, of the Court in Plant can be used in 
an argument that non-communicative cellphone information reveals details of the 
personal and private decisions of users. Similarly, the decision in Dagg confirms that 
movement and location can receive constitutional protection. 
 
                                                 
100 Hunter v Southam 145.   
101 Hunter v Southam 145.   
102 Plant.   
103 Wise.   
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6 Conclusion  
Based on the information gleaned from the comparative evaluation of Canadian, 
American and European jurisdictions it will be attempted to establish a framework which 
can be utilised for South African practice.  
 
6 1 The Nature of Non-Communicative Cellphone Information  
Whether protection will be afforded to certain information will depend on the nature of 
the information. According to Steytler,104 the question that needs to be answered is: 
“Should it (the information) be worthy of protection?” The right to privacy should be 
confined to a biographical core of personal information, which may reveal intimate details 
of an individual’s lifestyle and personal choices; information which is of a “personal and 
confidential” nature.  
 
The following information can be extracted from the records of cell phone users: the time 
that a call was made; the duration of the call; the precise geographical area of the person 
making the call (the caller); and the precise geographical area of the person to whom the 
call was made (the recipient). If the details of a number of calls made by a user during a 
specific period are monitored, the movement of the individual can be tracked for that 
specific period.  
 
It is submitted that the abovementioned information is personal and reveals intimate 
details about the decisions and personal choices of an individual. By looking at this non-
communicative information certain inferences can be drawn and certain deductions can 
be made which will reveal an individual’s personal decisions and choices. On the face of it 
the information does not reveal anything about, for example, the political opinion or 
sexual preference of an individual. However, inferences relating thereto can be drawn by 
looking at the locations (such as a bar, shebeen, sports arena, club, church, and any other 
place of entertainment or worship) that are frequented by the individual. Much more is 
revealed than dialled telephone numbers105, and it also goes further than the mere 
furnishing of a cellphone number without a user’s consent.106 This type of information is 
referred to in the Protection of Personal Information Bill as special personal 
information107.  
 
Although the bill does not specifically state that a person has a right in his movement and 
location, it is argued that it is indeed this type of information that can be ascertained by 
looking at this non communicative cellphone information.  
It further is submitted that if the criteria identified in Plant’s case are applied to non-
communicative cell phone information, the information will be regarded as being 
personal and revealing of the personal choices and decisions of an individual. 
Determining where and when someone visited a certain dwelling/establishment may 
indicate the political, religious or sexual orientation and preferences of that person. 
Indeed, when one look at cell phone records, inferences can be drawn that an individual 
                                                 
104 Steytler 104.   
105 Malone v United Kingdom.   
106 Simons v P4 Radio.   
107 Bill also contains reference to “Special Personal Information” which is information concerning a child who is subject to parental 
control in terms of the law; or a data subject’s religious or philosophical beliefs, race or ethnic origin, trade union membership, 
political opinions, health, sexual life, or criminal behaviour.   
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made certain personal and private decisions. 
 
The non-communicative information was not created in the context of a commercial 
transaction. The numbers dialled, and especially the duration of calls, are collected in 
order for the cell phone companies to furnish users with an account. It, however, is not 
necessary to include details of location and movement in accounts to clients. These details 
are captured only incidentally because of the manner in which various cell phones 
communicate via cellphone towers when a call is made. Information about the movement 
and location of cellphone users is not the exclusive property of cellphone companies.  
 
Further, only cellphone subscribers who enter into cellphone contracts receive accounts; 
prepaid cellphone users do not. It, therefore, cannot be said that the non-communicative 
information forms part of the commercial records of cellphone companies.108 
 
The nature of the relationship between the cell phone user and the cellphone company 
can be characterised as a relationship of confidence. The records of the duration of calls 
and of numbers dialled are kept as part of an ongoing commercial relationship. Cell 
phone companies are obliged to keep the records of their contract subscribers (not 
prepaid customers) confidential. It is generally not possible for an individual to inquire 
about the cellphone accounts or records of other users, and the information is not subject 
to inspection by members of the public at large.  
 
The retrieval of information by law enforcement officials also indicates that cell phone 
users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the cell phone records; the 
police are able to obtain the information only by virtue of prior judicial authorisation, 
which is achieved in South Africa by the issuing of a subpoena in terms of section 205 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act.109 An individual does have a reasonable expectation that the 
information in possession of the cell phone companies will be kept in confidence and 
restricted to the purposes for which it is obtained. 
 
6 1 1 Is the information conveyed voluntarily?  
It has been held in the US that if information about an individual is conveyed voluntarily 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy therein.110 It is submitted that the 
information regarding the movement and location of cell phone users is not conveyed 
voluntarily to the cell phone companies. It is debatable whether some users are even 
aware that they are transmitting these details. It is a contentious issue that cell phone 
companies have access to this type of non-communicative information, but for present 
purposes it is accepted that the information has been validly obtained. For cell phone 
information to be regarded as being voluntarily conveyed, the individual cell phone user 
must be aware that these details are recorded.  
 
In determining whether or not information regarding the location and movement of cell 
phone users should fall within the ambit of privacy protection it is useful to use the 
criteria of the two-tier approach. It is submitted that cell phone users do have a 
                                                 
108 United States v Miller.   
109 Act 51 of 1977.   
110 Smith v Maryland.   
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reasonable expectation of privacy in their movement and location, which will satisfy the 
first leg of the requirement, which is the subjective expectation. The objective element in 
this inquiry will be satisfied in that society will be willing to regard this expectation as 
being reasonable.111 While it can be accepted that prisoners,112 persons in police custody, 
arrested persons, or those who are lawfully detained, have a limited expectation of privacy 
in their movements, the same cannot be said of cell phone users. They do have a right to 
privacy in their movement113 and location.114  
 
If a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his arrival at, and departure from, a 
certain location even if it is their place of employment,115 then the movement of arrival at, 
and departure from, a location ascertained from cellphone records should also be 
protected. In addition, information about the location of cellphone users should not be 
divulged without their consent or without obtaining prior judicial authorisation. 
 
6 2 How should this intrusion of the right to privacy be regulated?  
The content of an individual’s telecommunications is private and confidential. The state 
will be able to access it only with prior judicial authorisation.116 If it is accepted that a 
right to privacy exists in non-communicative information, the question that needs to be 
addressed is: how should interference with that right be regulated?  
 
International law prescribes that there should not be any unlawful interference with the 
privacy of individuals. Interferences are allowed only if they are not arbitrary or unlawful 
in terms of domestic laws, which must specify in detail the precise circumstances in which 
such interferences will be permitted.117  
 
In the Petersen118 case the police obtained authorisation to access the cellphone records. 
But could they have obtained the information if there were not enough evidence to obtain 
a section 205 warrant?  
 
For instance, if the police have established an individual’s time of death at a particular 
place, could they trawl through cell phone records for persons who may have been there 
at that time to establish a suspicion? Could they look at the records of everyone at the 
scene of the crime to enable them to round up suspects? At what stage should police be 
allowed to have access to this type of information which can assist in them in the 
prevention and solving of crime?  
 
There should be no objection to the obtaining and the publication of the information if the 
cellphone user has consented to the divulging thereof. In the absence of prior obtained 
consent from the user, it is submitted that the police will always require a section 205 
warrant, and they can only obtain a section 205 warrant if certain conditions are met.  
                                                 
111 The two-requirement test referred to in Katz v United States 353.  
Kyllo v United States.   
112 R v Dorfer.   
113 R v Wise.   
114 Dagg v Canada (Minster of Finance) [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403.   
115 Dagg.   
116 Section 40 RICA Act.   
117 Steytler 80.   
118 S v Peteresen.   
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The police should have at least a suspicion before prior judicial authorisation in the form 
of a subpoena is granted; they should not be allowed to access the records in order to form 
a suspicion. This is not the purpose of prior judicial authorisation.119 
 
It is preferable to have a system of prior authorisation to prevent unjustified searches 
than to have a system of subsequent validation.120 If prior judicial authorisation is 
required, certain evidence must be available or certain requirements should be complied 
with, as was stipulated in Hunter v Southam121that reasonable and probable grounds, 
established under oath, to believe that an offence has been committed and that there is 
evidence to be found at the place of the search, constituted the minimum standard.  
 
The issue in Plant122 can be distinguished from the issue regarding cellphone information. 
In that case it was stated that the appellant could not be said to have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in relation to the computerised electricity consumption records 
which outweighed the interests of the state in enforcing the laws relating to narcotic 
offences; therefore, it was not necessary to obtain prior judicial authorisation. It is 
submitted that if the principles adopted in Plant are applied to cellphones, it will be found 
that a reasonable expectation of privacy does exist in non-communicative cellphone 
information. Therefore, to obtain details, such as, the location and movement of users, 
which are indicative of their personal choices and lifestyle would necessitate prior judicial 
authorisation.  
 
6 3 Application of principle  
If access to information in the possession of third parties is not regulated properly by 
legislation, the anonymity of users will be lost. Information obtained from a customer’s 
personal bank records reflecting withdrawal dates, the times and locations of transactions 
at ATM machines, as well as details of credit card purchases, will all provide details of an 
individual’s whereabouts and movements. Technology advances at an alarming pace and 
in future third parties could be in possession of, and have access to, information 
containing biometric features (such as fingerprints, palmprints, voice and eyescan DNA 
features).123 If all information in the possession of third parties is not regulated properly, 
it effectively will remove an individual’s right to determine what information about them 
others should know.  
 
6 4 Conclusion  
In conclusion, it is submitted that the nature and extent of non-communicative 
information (such as, location and movement of users) obtained from cellphone records is 
worthy of being protected by the right to privacy, since they disclose details about a 
person’s personal lifestyle and choices. Although it is not strictly part of the inner 
core/inner sanctum or the privacy rights that can exist in a business of an individual, a 
person’s family life, sexual relationships, and sexual preferences can be disclosed by 
                                                 
119 The purpose of prior judicial authorization was defined in Hunter v Southam and can be summarized as follows: To provide an 
opportunity for the conflicting interests of the state and the individual to be assessed. An individual’s right to privacy will be 
breached only if an appropriate standard has been met and where the interests of the state are superior. The assessment of the 
evidence must be done in an entirely neutral and impartial manner.   
120R v Wise.    
121 Hunter v Southam.   
122 Plant.   
123 Van Tonder K “Biometrics Identifiers and Privacy” (August 2003) De Rebus August 19.   
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looking at the non-communicative information. Because a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists in this type of information, access thereto should be regulated properly. The 
records should not be trawled in order to form a suspicion. A suspicion should have been 
present before an application is made to obtain any form of prior judicial authorisation. 
At least in the Protection of Personal Information Bill124 information such as a data 
subjects religious or philosophical beliefs, race or ethnic origin, trade union membership, 
political opinions, health, sexual life, or criminal behaviour is regarded as special personal 
information which warrants protection.  
 
Although the Bill does not specifically state that a person has a right in his movement and 
location, it is argued that it is indeed this type of special personal information as referred 
to in the Bill, that can be ascertained by looking at this non communicative cellphone 
information. 
                                                 
124 The Protection of Personal Information Bill [B9-2009].   
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